About human rights

The question of human rights, their formulation and, in a more general fashion, their universality have been much discussed. However, quickly, and from one side and the other, blunders were committed due to an over-simplification of things. For the defenders of human rights, the founding text must be taken as it is. Any remark or criticism reflects an unclean positioning "which hides something". In their view, to discuss the formulation of these rights or their universality is a dissimulated way of not wanting to respect them. One finds in the argumentation of their Muslim contradictors the same hastiness. According to the latter, these rights are based on reason alone and do not refer to the link which unites man with his Creator. As such, this Declaration is in opposition to the teachings of the Qur'an and the tradition. Here we have reached, from one side as from the other, a conclusion slightly similar to the one we encountered regarding the question of democracy. Islam and human rights, then, cannot go hand in hand.

It is, nonetheless, important to stop for a moment and consider that we cannot make such an economy in this debate. To read a text without taking account of the circumstances and context which brought it forth can lead to serious inconsequences. To forget the historical origin of the Declaration of Human Rights and the compost of human philosophy which gave it shape, is strictly speaking a nonsense that is justified only by this fierce will to make it a universal tool. This along the disconcerting paradox of a rationality which takes its source and meaning in the rejection of absolute principles and which will end up producing one itself. It is a strange approach indeed!

Without entering too much into the detail of historical elaboration, it should be pointed out that diverse English, French and American Declarations, since the Seventeenth century, have been, first, the effect of a mobilisation of religious and humanist minorities desiring to defend their rights. It is this viewpoint which, after the Renaissance, was conveyed in the course of its struggle and which opposed both the humanists and the precursors of rationalist thought to religious authority. Born and thought in the West by intellectuals who were battling against oppressive forces - themselves justified in the name of the absolute - the philosophy of human rights is marked, in its essence, by such an origin. Before being a universal tool, it indicates a moment of the history of the liberation of reason vis-à-vis dogma, and of the assertion of the individual and his autonomy against the oppression of a power and a religion which denied him. Thus, historically speaking, the process is of the order of a reaction. It was an attempt to assert oneself and liberate oneself from imposed duties that rights based solely on rationality were codified and declared. Whatever our desire to defend the rights of human beings, we find ourselves with the obligation to acknowledge that the dynamic which gave rise to these texts contains three basic characteristics. By its own history, it determines the primacy of rational norm. It bases itself on a defence of human autonomy. Lastly, it is the realisation of the rejection of any absolute.

The philosophy which is implied by human rights is culturally marked and belongs to a vast elaboration of analytic thought where all the postulates are significant in the Western history of mentalities. It carries in itself stigmas of the tensions which marked its history. Moreover, this same characteristic is found in the notion of "tolerance." It is indeed a question of a human interpretation of the relations between men. But the point of view is here reversed. By the idea of tolerance is meant a peculiar attitude ensuing from a position of strength at the level of the rapport between human beings. Human rights convey a reaction in order to assert the right of each human being. Tolerance consists of measuring its action in order not to prevent the other from being who he is. The viewpoints expressed are not identical, but the source is the same. The formulation of the principle of tolerance is linked to the formation of rationalist thought. Other cultures, and Islam in particular, do not formulate the universe of coexistence placed at the level of rational norm only.(33)

Does this mean that the origin and philosophy of human rights justifies their pure and simple rejection and takes away any weight vis-à-vis their respect? A conclusion of such nature would be baseless. Reinserted in the context of the rationalist dynamic, human rights are one of the most positive achievements and one must point out the well known improvement that the juridical instrument -which accompanied the declarations - helped to bring about. The Declaration of 1948 is a point of reference from which we can derive today basic, general principles which go along the lines of respect for human dignity. The same can be said about all philosophical developments since Locke which have allowed Western societies to be more tolerant. The facts are there, it is not possible to deny them. These societies, nurtured by their reference to human rights, have concern for the respect of human beings, their equality and liberty. The lacunae are important, everyone knows it, but the progress is undeniable.

We should not have any pain in acknowledging these realities, for intellectual probity invites us to do so. One has, nevertheless, to go further in the analysis. Once the philosophical nature of "human rights" and, at the same time their positive contribution in the context of their elaboration, are acknowledged, we have to summarily explain how the question of man and his rights are elaborated in Islam. Not with the idea of opposing one concept with another, but rather with a concern for showing that if, on strictly philosophical substance, there are differences, one also finds points of convergence which should allow us to go beyond debates of reciprocal rejection.

The fact that there exists in Islam two points of reference, where human thought derives its orientation, shatters the perspective which we talked about. Moreover, we cannot, in all logic, be satisfied with the formulation which is relative to it.(34) There exists, as we have said, a vast domain of Islamic rationality, but the latter does not fix its marks in an autonomous fashion, or solely in function of the tension which it perceives among men. Before that, there exists a holistic concept which radiates the entire domain of action. That is in the relation between God and men, men between themselves and finally between men and nature. The relationship with God comes first and this in each one of these domains. The notion of responsibility and duty come first. Beyond the peripheries of history, conflicts, claims and reactions, the Islamic teaching imprints its mark first on the action of each individual. The latter has obligations towards God, himself, other human beings as also towards nature before possessing rights. Moreover, the rights of each one will be better respected in the exact proportion whereby each individual respects his own duties. As we have said earlier, human rights are the outcome of a historical process of liberation. The Islamic concept is differently based on an exigency of balance. It does not formulate rights in function of a threat of oppression, but rather with the idea that man is from the outset a responsible being(35) who must be accountable for his choice. Human rights exist in Islam, but they are, nevertheless, part of a holistic vision which orientate their scope.(36) The differences are substantial but they must not lead us to conclude the impossibility of dialogue between the two civilisations. On the contrary, if the source is different, it is nonetheless possible to find in Islam, (as indeed in the texts of Jewish and Christian traditions), orientations and fundamental principles of rights stemming from obligations which agree with those emanating from the text of 1948.

It is this, when all is said and done, that one must look for. It is putting evidence, within the framework of the Islamic point of reference, as indeed at the heart of each diverse culture, the elements that allow the disengagement of a concept of man (of his rights) thanks to which the discovery of common points will be possible. By referring to the Qur'an and the Sunna, by considering the work of ijtihad of the '[ulama' and by developing and pursuing reflection in this sense, one realises that one can subtract from the centre of Islamic legislation, from the Shari[a, elements relating to rights. Respect of the latter is primal in comparison to any application of punishments ([uqubat). These include the right to life, freedom, equality, non-discrimination, justice, asylum, and the right to liberty of conscience, etc. (37)

In fact, if the universality of human rights - as stated in the version of the 1948 Declaration - causes a problem for Muslims, this does not mean that Islam rejects or refutes any thought relating to human rights if understood as the protection of human dignity. On the contrary, all the juridical thought of Islam revolves, so much in the objective of its obligations as in that of its rights, around the respect and inviolability of the person, whether man, woman or child. Now that the points of reference are identified, the differences arranged and the similarities recognised, what is appropriate now is to look beyond a dispute over words to the means to achieve a concrete and better respect of human rights. To use the latter as an ideological tool which confirms Western superiority over other civilisations would be unfortunate. The important thing, and this is so in each culture, is to set in motion the movement that allows approach of the respective models which enable the application of fundamental rights.

If there really exists a pluralism, and if there is a sincere will to engage in the co-existence of civilisations and cultures, then this must proceed from here. Imposing one's norms on others will inevitably mean conflicts. But to call each religion and culture to develop from within spaces of protection for the dignity of woman, man and child is, in our view, the choice of the future. Moreover, there must also exist the resolve to want to make one's rights respected everywhere, at all times with the greatest of equities. It is in a concrete, permanent engagement in the field that the living forces of civilisations can encounter with one another, have dialogue and a common cause against the suicidal by-products of our time. This for the sake of God, men, our children and before our own consciences.

At the time when these lines are re-read, the world is witnessing a live massacre. The ethnic cleansing led by the Serbs is being carried out before the hearing and sight of all the inhabitants of our planet. Mass executions, rapes and deportations are being perpetrated, while the cynicism of Serb officials is met with the biased calculations of the great powers. Bosnia is on fire, covered with blood while the waffle goes on. While human rights are suppressed, stamped over, and denied people gather and keep gathering again. In 1992, we were presented with a formidable mobilisation against Iraq, who invaded Kuwait, as the concerted action of the great powers for the safeguarding of freedom, human rights and democracy. Everything was good in order to justify for us the good "Desert Storm". We have been told lies, so many lies, and the lies continue. Humanitarian arguments are weighed with the interests which they defend and the dead are valued according to the interest which justifies them. The worst enemy of human rights and the worst insult to the 1948 Declaration is not caused by Islamic, Indian or other differences, rather the worst enemy is indeed this variable utilisation of the most beautiful texts for the most sombre of interests. The worst insult lies indeed in this unconditional support for the most bloody and repressive dictatorial regimes ever to exist. This unconditional support coupled with "non-violent" inclination in discourse and which denounces the violence of those who are forced to take arms because of the suppression they live under. Political violence must be denounced, but how is it not possible to understand, from the depth of what gives meaning to the life of a human being, that after years of terrible repression, men mobilise themselves and decide to put a stop to such situations. For, if one must die being denied in one' being, then one would rather die in dignity. This attitude is understood, but it certainly cannot be justified. However, with the same force one must say, and repeat, say and denounce, say and say again that nothing justifies the sinister calculations of rich countries nor the passivity of their public opinion. Before God and before our consciences, nothing justifies them nor does anything enable the understanding of such a degree of acceptance and lassitude bordering on complicity.

How can it be imagined that the inhabitants of the South, whether Muslim or not, still believe in the grandeur of human rights? How is it still to be hoped that they trust those who do not hesitate to ward off the most cupid of their interests by means of the most beautiful discourse of humanist intentions. It would be just as insane to ask the homeless, unemployed and those excluded from society to believe the sincere respect that their politicians have towards them. The problem of human rights today, like the problem of the rights acknowledged by Islam but which are violated every day, is that it still belongs to the domain of theory and intention while everything is allowed in practice. Whether it be from the side of Western powers or from the majority of Muslim governments, of which we can today measure the strength of hypocrisy, the points of reference are suppressed. The same people who cite articles of diverse humanist declarations, and the same people who recite out of memory a Qur'anic verse or a prophetic tradition, have blood on their hands and prisons consecrated to the denial of rights and to torture. The most beautiful poem which is stained with blood has a bitter tone. Undoubtedly, silence is better than this betrayal. Our common engagement starts exactly here. With determination, rigour and conviction one must give witness to our faithfulness in the face of all betrayals. We should do this firmly, conversely and practically, for it is a duty of conscience for those who defend the dignity of rights.

Dr Tariq Ramadan